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PART I
POST-EFA DISCOURSE IN THE
HISTORICAL, STRUCTURAL,
NORMATIVE, AND
GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS
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EDUCATION FOR ALL AS A
GLOBAL REGIME OF
EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE:
ISSUES AND TENSIONS
Leon Tikly
ABSTRACT
The chapter traces the genealogy of the Education for All (EFA)
Movement understood as a global regime of educational governance
between 1990 and 2005. The chapter sets out the achievements of EFA
including some success in uniting diverse interests around a common set
of goals. It will also discuss the key tensions related to the Northern and
Western-led nature of EFA; tensions between the multilateral agencies
over the leadership of EFA and the issues associated with the hegemonic
status assumed by the World Bank; the tension between a wider EFA
agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets; and the asso-
ciated tensions between more economistic and rights-based views of
EFA. It will be argued that the development of these tensions can be
understood in relation to different kinds of power linked to the inter-
national political economy and to the impact of other global regimes AU:2.
Post-Education-for-All and Sustainable Development Paradigm: Structural Changes
with Diversifying Actors and Norms
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INTRODUCTION
The aim in this chapter is to provide an understanding of Education for All
(EFA) as an evolving global regime of educational governance. The chapter
will outline key historical events in the period between 1990 and 2005 that
have been the key in shaping EFA as a movement. It is hoped that such an
analysis will provide a useful context for considering other contributions to
this volume that deal with more recent developments in EFA in the context
of the emerging post-2015 education and development agenda.1 In develop-
ing understanding the chapter will set out the achievements of EFA includ-
ing the extent to which it has proved successful in uniting diverse interests
around a common set of goals as well as on the identification of key
tensions. These include the Northern and Western-led nature of EFA both
in terms of its governance and its underlying norms and values; tensions
between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and issues
associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank; the
tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few
quantifiable targets; associated tensions between more economistic and
rights-based views of EFA. It will be argued that the development of
these tensions can be seen in relation to the exercise of different kinds of
power linked to the broader international political economy as well as to
the relationship between EFA and other global regimes. The chapter will
commence by presenting a conceptual framework for understanding EFA
as a global regime of educational governance and in relation to different
forms of power. This will provide a basis for a discussion of key events in
the development of EFA through which key issues and tensions will
be traced.
UNDERSTANDING EFA ARCHITECTURE AS A
GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE
In seeking to explain the development of EFA the chapter will build on
recent work on global governance in the field of international relations
(e.g. Barnett & Duvall, 2014; Digwerth & Pattberg, 2006; Mosse, 2005;
Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013; Ruggie, 2014) including a more specialised
literature that has sought to apply the concept to education (e.g. Jones, 2005;
Mundy & Manion, 2014; Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Mundy & Verger, 2015).
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In an oft-quoted passage, the UN-endorsed report on global governance
provided the following definition:
Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private,
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or
diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal
arrangements that people and institutions have either agreed to or perceive to be in their
interests …. At a global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmen-
tal relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving nongovernmental
organisations, citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital
market. Interacting with these are the global mass media of dramatically enlarged
influence. (Commission for Global Governance, 1995 in Mundy & Manion, 2014, p. 41)
The idea of global governance has emerged relatively recently as an alterna-
tive to the previous, state-centred way of understanding how global issues
such as EFA are governed. Mundy and Manion (2014) explain the emer-
gence of the concept in relation to three phenomena that are deeply impli-
cated in the emergence of the EFA architecture. Firstly, the end of the cold
war signalled a shift from bilateral to multilateral support for education
and other areas of donor assistance. Secondly, the development of contem-
porary globalisation which has been associated with the opening up of
national boundaries, and the strengthening of regional and multilateral
institutions that although influenced by national governments (and in parti-
cular powerful national governments and alliances of governments) operate
with a degree of relative autonomy. Thirdly, as careful scholarship has
shown (e.g. Jones, 2006; Jones & Coleman, 2005; Mundy & Verger, 2015),
global issues such as EFA are shaped by tensions and contradictions linked
to the peculiarities of organisational structure, purpose, norms and values
of these institutions as much as they are by overt national or global inter-
ests. Important for our discussion, global governance understood in these
terms is contested in that the effects of global flows and networks are
mediated and modified at the regional and local levels. Significant here has
been the emergence of a global civil society that has at times challenged
and modified dominant global agendas, and this has had implications for
the way that EFA has been shaped (see also, Tikly, 2001).
At a theoretical level the end of the cold war and the deepening of globa-
lisation processes have increasingly been explained in terms of constructi-
vist theories of international relations in which shared normative and
ideational structures and processes  of which EFA is an example  are
seen as influencing the actions of actors at different levels including
national governments. Extending the above, EFA can best be understood
39Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
Un
co
rre
cte
d P
ro
of
as an educational example of a ‘governance regime’. Regimes are com-
monly defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in
a given area of international relations’ (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 29). In this
sense EFA has involved the convergence of key governmental and non-
governmental institutions at the global, regional and national levels around
a distinct series of international agreements, framework documents, proto-
cols and reports as will be discussed. Significantly, as Mundy and Manion
(2014) explain, EFA has emerged from previous education and develop-
ment regimes (below). It is also the case that EFA sits alongside other
regimes. Of significance here, for example, is the regime around the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); around international assess-
ments and educational policy development clustered around the OECD,
which continues to have an impact on EFA thinking; regimes concerned
with aid effectiveness and regimes in other sectors that have influenced the
EFA agenda such as those around the global campaign against HIV/AIDS
and those concerning the regulation of global markets. We will return to a
consideration of the implications of this in the discussion below.
The work of the international relations theorists (Barnett & Duvall,
2014) has been found particularly valuable in understanding the tensions at
the heart of EFA. These scholars argue that much work on global govern-
ance has not included a sustained consideration of power and that ‘this
is paradoxical because governance and power are inextricably linked.
Governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regu-
late, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of
power. To account for how global activities are guided and how world
orders are produced, therefore, requires careful and explicit analysis of the
workings of power’ (p. 2).
The authors define power as ‘the production, in and through social rela-
tions, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own
circumstances and fate’ (p. 3). They distinguish between different kinds of
power that operate within the sphere of international relations. They are
each relatively autonomous, linked to different global structures and causal
mechanisms with different loci and have causes and effects at different
levels and scales. They define compulsory power as comprising the relations
of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another. In
the context of the present discussion this is most obvious that it will be
argued in the conditionalities that have been attached to aid.
A second type of power is institutional in which states design interna-
tional institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to
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the disadvantage of others. In relation to the development of EFA it is
manifested in the historical dominance of the interests of powerful,
Western nations in the governance structures of global financial institutions
such as the World Bank (e.g. Jones, 2005, 2006). Similarly, the OECD
which has been influential, as we will see in the development of EFA dis-
course, is made up of an exclusive club of highly industrialised countries.
EFA discourses, it will be suggested, are also the outcome of contestation
between different institutions and between multilateral organisations and
global civil society each wielding different amounts of institutional power.
Barnett and Duval also identify structural power, which concerns the
constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to
one another. One expression of this form of power is the working of the
global capitalist economy, in producing unequal social relations of produc-
tion between capital and labour. Class relationships of dominance and
subordination in international relationships also intersect in complex ways
with those of gender and race (Rupert, 2014). Although less obvious to
observe empirically in relation to the development of EFA, an understand-
ing of structural power is nonetheless fundamental for understanding the
wider political global economy against which the development of EFA
must be understood. Although a detailed discussion of the nature of struc-
tural power is beyond the scope of the present chapter, reference will be
made to deeper analyses of the relationship between education and the
global political economy that have been undertaken elsewhere (see,
e.g. Robertson et al., 2007; Tikly, 2003, 2004).
Finally, productive power is the socially diffused production of subjectiv-
ity in systems of meaning and signification including the way that ‘develop-
ment’ itself is defined and understood. As with structural power the
workings of productive power are less obvious than those of compulsory
and institutional power but no less important than other kinds of power
for understanding how the identities of different actors are constituted and
the policies of different institutions are discursively framed. In the sections
below, it will be argued that the underlying view of education and develop-
ment informing EFA has been informed by dominant economistic
discourses on the one hand and by rights-based discourses on the other.
Importantly for our analysis the different forms of power do not operate
in isolation from each other but interact. Thus, for example, the ability for
governments or groups of governments to exercise compulsory power
over other governments relies on the extent of institutional power within
institutions that preside over global governance regimes and indeed to the
relative power exercised by competing institutions in the context of specific
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regimes. Institutional power is in turn linked to how ruling coalitions
within national governments are positioned in relation to global markets.
Productive power can be seen to operate in and through different ‘epistemic
communities’ (Haas, 1992) clustered around different disciplinary under-
standings of education and development that can inform the workings and
programmes of different institutions sometimes in contradictory ways.
THE GENEALOGY OF EFA AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF
EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE
The focus of this section is on tracing the genealogy of EFA as a regime of
global governance. The section will be organised around discussion of key
events including the Jomtien and Dakar conferences on EFA in the
so-called decade of conferences which set out the vision of EFA in a series
of principles; the DAC/OECD framework and millennium summit which
endorsed the use of time-bound targets as a means for holding governments
and donors to account for delivering on EFA; the Fast Track Initiative
(later to evolve into a Global Partnership for Education) which provided a
mechanism for donors to pool resources around key EFA priorities and the
Rome and Paris Declarations and protocols which set out a series of princi-
ples relating to aid effectiveness. A rich literature describing the key
moments in the emergence of the EFA architecture already exists and has
been useful for the present discussion. The aim here is not to repeat this
rich history in detail. Rather, as suggested in the introduction it is to
identify key tensions that have characterised EFA and to relate these to a
consideration of the influence of different kinds of power.
Before proceeding to a discussion of events pivotal to the development
of EFA it is important to provide some historical context. As many
commentators have pointed out, EFA needs to be seen against the back-
ground of the wider shift in development thinking between the so-called
Washington and post-Washington consensuses. The emergence of EFA
needs to be set against the crisis of the so-called Washington consensus and
the emergence of the post-Washington consensus. Much has been written
about this shift (see e.g. Robertson et al., 2007). The Washington consensus
can be seen as a response to the global economic crisis of the 1970s and
was influenced by the spread of neo-liberal thinking linked to the rise of
Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States.
At the heart of neoliberalism is the idea of rolling back the state, increasing
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the role for the private sector and liberalising trade. More specifically, and in
relation to the low-income world, the Washington consensus was linked to
the introduction of Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Polices (SAPs)
by the World Bank and IMF. SAPS linked lending to low-income countries
to conditionalities. In Barnett and Duvall’s (2014) terms this equates to the
use of compulsory power by the international financial institutions to impose
aid conditionalities on low-income countries. In public services including
health and education these conditionalities generally amounted to the intro-
duction of user fees, privatisation and decentralisation. The underlying ratio-
nale was that these measures would make services more accountable to the
public and drive up the quality of services through encouraging diversifica-
tion and competition between service providers. However, SAPS had disas-
trous consequences AU:3for the poor (Samoff, 1994). The introduction of user
fees, for example, led to a decline in enrolments in many low-income coun-
tries. As some commentators have argued, the growth in the overall levels of
poverty and inequality associated with the imposition of SAPs can be seen as
an expression of structural power in the global economy as these policies
were seen to work in the interests of global and national elites rather than
those of the poor (see Tikly, 2003, p. 4; Robertson et al., 2007; Rupert, 2014).
The period also saw a realignment in the balance of institutional
power linked to growing criticisms of the World Bank/IMF Washington
Consensus reforms from a variety of sources from the United Nations insti-
tutions to civil society organisations and NGOs in the global North and
South (Cornia, 2001; Walton & Seddon, 1994). Some of these tensions have
their roots in historical differences between a more economist approach to
development embraced by the international financial institutions on the one
hand and the more rights-based approach adopted by the UN agencies and
many NGOs on the other hand. There was also a mounting evidence from
cross-national studies as to the failure of SAPs to address poverty. It was
argued that structural adjustment polices were undermining the capacity of
low-income countries to ensure stability and social cohesion and to provide
for the most vulnerable sections of society. The call for ‘adjustment with a
human face’ (Cornia, 2001) represented a challenge to the international
financial institutions and the failure of SAPs to either reduce poverty and
inequality or to achieve sustained economic growth in low-income countries.
For their part, the global financial institutions blamed the failure of SAPs
on poor governance including inefficiency, mismanagement, over-centralised
services and corruption. The emerging so-called post-Washington consensus
thus emphasised poverty alleviation through providing a safety net for
the poorest, a greater emphasis on social cohesion and the need for ‘good
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governance’ including great accountability of governments in the use of
public funds and decentralisation. At the heart of the realignment of institu-
tional power in the context of the shift to the post-Washington consensus was
a closer coming together of the major multilateral agencies including the
various UN agencies and the international financial institutions around a
common commitment to poverty reduction which came to be seen as synon-
ymous with development itself (Robertson et al., 2007).
There was also a greater recognition of the significance of civil society
organisations and NGOs in human development through their role in pro-
moting social capital. From 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes
(PRSPs) began to replace SAPs as the IMF/World Bank mechanism to
develop national policy agreements. PRSPs were supposed to be ‘country-
driven’ and thus would promote strong national ownership of development
strategies including broad and active involvement of civil society. They
were also ‘result orientated’ with a clear focus on benefiting the poor, ‘com-
prehensive’ in their understanding of the multidimensional nature of pov-
erty, ‘partnership oriented’ involving careful coordination between all the
different stakeholders and donors and ‘long term’ with a view to addressing
poverty reduction. In educational terms PRSPs were linked to the removal
of user fees for basic education to encourage access for the poorest and to
a continued emphasis on decentralisation and privatisation and the prioriti-
sation of Universal Primary Education. The post-Washington consensus in
education as in other spheres thus provided both a degree of continuity
and change on the Washington consensus. It also demonstrated despite the
realignment in power the continuing influence/hegemony of the global
financial institutions within the field of education and development.
The emergence of EFA needs to be understood against this broader
background. Education was seen by the World Bank as central to poverty
alleviation through its role in promoting economic growth. In addition,
education, particularly for girls, was also perceived to have other benefits
including improved health and a reduction in fertility rates (Robertson
et al., 2007). There was also an emerging sense of global collective responsi-
bility for access to basic education not just for the purposes of economic
development but also as a universal human right. The Bank’s commitment
to Universal Primary Education (UPE), which came to lie at the heart of
EFA, in fact emerged during the Washington Consensus era. The negative
effects of SAPs on enrolments proved to be a source of contradiction with
the goals of UPE. From the 1990s, however, and in the context of the post-
Washington consensus, funding for UPE began to be represented more as
an issue for donors and the international community as much as for
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national governments. This shift in thinking from education being seen pri-
marily as a national concern to one that lay at the centre of the interna-
tional development agenda provided the basis for the emergence of EFA as
a global regime of educational governance.
JOMTIEN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EFA VISION
The origin of the concept of EFA is generally associated with the World
Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in Jomtien in 1990 which resulted
in the World Declaration on Education for All and a Framework for Action to
Meet Basic Learning Needs (Inter-Agency Commission, 1990). The WCEFA
was one of seven World Conferences held during the 1990s, the others being
in the areas of children (New York, September 1990); environment (Rio de
Janeiro, 1992); human rights (Vienna, 1993); population (Cairo, 1994); social
development (Copenhagen, 1995); women (Beijing, 1995); human settlements
(Istanbul, 1996); food security (Rome, 1996) and climate change (Kyoto,
1997). The conference was attended by some 1,500 participants, representing
national and multinational donor agencies, national governments, inter-
governmental and non-governmental organisations, the education research
community as well as specialists in other sectors (Buchert, 1995).
The Declaration stipulated the goal of EFA as attainable by 2000 and
listed the strategies by which to reach it. The goal was rooted in the follow-
ing principles:
• Education as a fundamental right;
• The importance of education for a safer, healthier, more prosperous and
environmentally sound world and for social, economic and cultural
progress, tolerance and International cooperation;
• The importance of education for personal and social improvement;
• The value and validity of traditional knowledge and indigenous cultural
heritage in their own rights and as a promoter of development;
• The deficiency of the current provision of education in terms of quantity,
quality and relevance and
• The recognition that sounds basic education is fundamental to the
strengthening of higher levels of education and a scientific and technolo-
gical literacy and capacity and thus to self-reliant development stipulated
the goal of EFA as attainable by the year 2000 and listed the strategies
by which to reach it.
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The framework for action suggested six dimensions rather than specific
targets or goals, and these are set out in Table 1. The seeds of many of the
tensions at the heart of EFA were present at the outset in the WCEFA.
Firstly, in terms of the balance of institutional power within the emerging
Table 1. Jomtien and Dakar Goals Compared AU:6.
19902000: Jomtien 20002015: Dakar
1. Expansion of early childhood care and
development activities, including family and
community interventions, especially for
poor, disadvantaged and disabled children.
1. Expanding and improving comprehensive
early childhood care and education,
especially for the most vulnerable and
disadvantaged children.
2. Universal access to, and completion of,
primary education (or whatever higher level
of education is considered as ‘basic’) by the
year 2000.
2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children,
particularly girls, children in difficult
circumstances and those belonging to ethnic
minorities, have access to and complete free
and compulsory primary education of
good quality.
3. Improvement in learning achievement such
that an agreed percentage of an appropriate
age cohort (e.g. 80% 14-year-olds) attains
or surpasses a defined level of necessary
learning achievement.
3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all
young people and adults are met through
equitable access to appropriate learning and
life skills programmes.
4. Reduction in the adult illiteracy rate (the
appropriate age cohort to be determined in
each country) to, say, one-half its 1990 level
by the year 2000, with sufficient emphasis
on female literacy to significantly reduce the
current disparity between the male and
female illiteracy rates.
4. Achieving a 50% improvement in levels of
adult literacy by 2015, especially for
women, and equitable access to basic and
continuing education for all adults.
5. Expansion of provision of basic education
and training in other essential skills
required by youth and adults, with
programme effectiveness assessed in terms
behavioural changes and impacts on health,
employment and productivity.
5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary
and secondary education by 2015, with a
focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal
access to and achievement in basic
education of good quality.
6. Increased acquisition by individuals and
families of the knowledge, skills and values
required for better living and sound and
sustainable development, made available
through all educational channels including
the mass media, other forms of modern and
traditional communication, and social
action, with effectiveness assessed in terms
of behavioural change.
6. Improving all aspects of the quality of
education and ensuring excellence of all so
that recognised and measurable learning
outcomes are achieved by all, especially in
literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.
Source: Torres (2001).
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aid architecture, although the Jomtien conference included a wide range of
stakeholders from Northern and Southern countries, it was still primarily
Northern-led. As King has put it:
If we were to summarize the role of southern governments, researchers and NGOs in
affecting substantially the content of the Jomtien Declaration and Framework for
Action, it was minor, if not minimal. Of course, key personnel were included in the
international steering group, there were regional meetings held in southern capitals to
discuss particular drafts, and there were NGO partners and government representatives
in most of the official national delegations. But the core drafting personnel were drawn
from the multilateral agencies. What national governments actually thought about the
excision from the global education agenda of secondary, technical and vocational edu-
cation and training, and higher education is not recorded in the Declaration or the
Framework. The mere fact of its being a World Conference at which 155 national dele-
gations were present is judged to be sufficient to suggest that the Jomtien agenda was
widely shared across the world—which it almost certainly was not. (King, 2007, p. 380)
The limited role of Southern governments in formulating the Jomtien EFA
agenda has led King to question the extent to which the agenda can be con-
sidered to be truly ‘owned’ by Southern countries. Secondly, although
Jomtien was jointly sponsored by five multilateral agencies, it was the
World Bank that assumed a dominant position in relation to the WCEFA
reflected in the appointment of Wadi Haddad, formerly of the World
Bank’s central education policy department into the position of chief execu-
tive (Jones & Coleman, 2005; King, 2007). The dominance of the World
Bank was reflected in its role in the lead up to WCEFA in developing and
championing a shared vision drawing on its own work over several decades
on the role of basic education as a key to national development.
However, although there was an agreement that EFA should focus on a
notion of ‘basic education’ and on ‘basic learning needs’ there were differ-
ences in the way that these were interpreted. UNESCO, building on earlier
conceptualisations of community education, championed an expanded
understanding of basic education to embrace early childhood education,
primary education, basic secondary and vocational education as well as
adult literacy. For the World Bank and UNICEF the focus was very much
on primary education and it was this focus that became increasingly
dominant throughout the EFA period, reflected, for example, in the
MDGs (below).
The emphasis on primary education as the best way of linking education
and development persisted despite the preferences of many low-income
country governments and arguments about the importance of post-primary
education (see Birdsall, 1996; Hayman, 2005; Palmer, 2006; Post et al.,
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2004; Tikly, 2003). One explanation of this continuing emphasis on primary
education may be found in the methodologies and associated funding poli-
cies of the World Bank. The rates-of-return analyses pioneered by
Psacharopoulos (1985) showed that the rates of return to investments in
primary education were higher than those from investing in vocational or
tertiary education, and these analyses drove Bank lending policy in educa-
tion increasingly from 1980 onward. The influence of rates-of-return analy-
sis on setting the global education agenda can be seen in Barnett and
Duvall’s (2014) terms as a specific example of the exercise of ‘productive
power’, that is as the dominance in discursive terms of a particular concep-
tion of education and economic growth. In the 1980s lending to the
primary sector made up 18.9% of bank funding to education; in the 1990s
it made up 35.6% and in 2001, 45%. The corresponding figures for voca-
tional post-secondary education, for instance, were 25.1%, 7.5% and 8.1%
for the respective periods (Robertson et al., 2007). The dominance of this
kind of analysis and reasoning is recognised both by those in the World
Bank who supported and promoted it (see Psacharopoulos, 1994, 2006;
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004) and by those who criticised and opposed
it (see Heyneman, 2003).
DAC/OECD REPORT ON ‘SHAPING THE
21ST CENTURY’
By 1996 and the EFA mid-term conference in Amman it was already clear
that EFA would not be achieved by 2000. During the same year the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a report
entitled ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development
Cooperation’ (OECD/DAC, 1996). Its purpose was to synthesise the
lessons learned for the first seven world congresses (above). The significance
of the report for the emerging EFA regime was that it reinforced the idea
of time-bound development targets that pre-figured the MDGs. The
ideas of a general time-bound education target to achieve EFA had pre-
viously been championed by UNICEF and was reflected in the Jomtien
Framework for Action (above). For the most part, however, the six dimen-
sions of EFA were presented more in the form of guidelines rather than
measurable targets. In this sense the intervention of the OECD can be seen
as a key moment in the development of productive power linked to an
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economistic view of education and development. The two targets that
related to education were:
• Universal primary education by 2015
• Demonstrated progress towards gender equality and the empowerment
of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary
education by 2005.
As with most of the other development targets in the report the date for
achieving UPE was set at 2015. The AU:4setting of the gender target at 2005 can
be seen as a consequence of the development of the gender equity target
within a different regime of global governance involving overlapping but
different actors and institutions than those involved in EFA concerned
with gender equity (King, 2007; Unterhalter, 2013). The targets provide
continuity on themes that began to emerge in Jomtien. For example, it
reinforces the Northern-led nature of EFA and the use of compulsory
power. Thus whilst the report contains much rhetoric about the need for
partnership between Northern and Southern countries in achieving human
development the report goes on to add that the targets
… represent only a proposal of what we AU:5as donors consider to be helpful measures of
progress to inspire effective development cooperation. Their achievement will require
agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own
national goals and locally-owned strategies. (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 9)
As Robertson et al. (2007) argue, the power relations between donors and
low-income countries implied here are clear. Whilst the targets are
presented as only a proposal of what ‘we as donors consider helpful’, it is
difficult to imagine them being resisted by the recipients of aid, whose con-
tribution will be ‘agreement and commitment through their own national
goals’ (see also King, 2007).
In terms of the conceptualisation of EFA the report contributed to the
narrowing of the EFA agenda to focus on UPE in keeping with the domi-
nant view of EFA within the World Bank. In this sense the report provides
an important milestone in the development of productive power linked to
an economistic discourse. As King and Rose (2005) have argued, as so
often happens in the setting of international policy objectives, the more
measurable, quantitative goals take precedence over the other factors that
the OECD/DAC Report also sought to emphasise, including the need for a
highly context-dependent approach which ‘gives a very different feel from
the one-size-fits-all shape of the IDTs’ (p. 364). The report in fact argued
that ‘these goals must be pursued country-by-country through individual
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approaches that reflect local conditions and locally owned strategies’
(OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2). It argued that there were a whole series of ‘qua-
litative factors’ that were ‘essential to the attainment of these measurable
goals’ (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2). These included capacity development for
democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law. These critical
qualifications of the quantitative targets get completely side-lined in the
presentation of the new ‘global development partnership effort’ around the
six ‘realisable’ goals (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2).
THE DAKAR FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
The Dakar Framework for Action and EFA targets were agreed at the
World Education Forum, held in Dakar, Senegal in 2000. The event was
organised by the International Consultative Forum on Education for All
(the EFA Forum), a body created in 1991 to monitor EFA and composed
of representatives of the five international agencies that sponsored the
initiative  UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA and the World
Bank  and of bilateral cooperation agencies, governments and NGOs,
as well as by some education specialists. Like Jomtien, over a thousand
people, representing governments, ivil society and international agencies,
attended the Forum. The purpose was to present the global results of the
evaluation of the Decade of ‘Education for All’ (EFA) launched in Jomtien
and to adopt a new Framework for Action in order to continue the task. As
was already evident half way through the decade, the six goals set in Jomtien
for the year 2000 had not been met. Thus, the Framework for Action
adopted in Dakar basically ‘reaffirmed’ the vision of the goals laid down in
Jomtien, but extended them for another 15 years, until 2015 reflecting the
time frame for the DAC/OECD targets (once again with the exception of
the gender targets). Table 1 compares the Dakar and Jomtien targets).
UNESCO was given responsibility by the Forum for monitoring
progress towards the Dakar goals. UNESCO has developed a whole infra-
structure to monitor progress towards the Dakar Goals and MDGs includ-
ing the High-Level Group (HLG) on EFA, Working Group (WG) on EFA
and International Advisory Panel (IAP) on EFA. It has convened regular
meetings of these entities to review EFA progress based on the EFA
Global Monitoring Report (GMR), which is submitted annually to the
Director-general of UNESCO. The report is translated into 11 languages
and widely disseminated. It is written to appeal to a range of stakeholders,
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although there is some evidence that it is more widely read by members
of the donor community than by national governments (King, 2007).
Nonetheless, the GMR has played a significant role over the years in the
development of a more nuanced view of EFA. Through the use of increas-
ingly sophisticated statistical analysis and the commissioning of numerous
background papers by leading experts in the field of education and devel-
opment, the GMR has played an intellectual leadership role in relation to
EFA. Rather than simply reporting development in achieving targets, the
GMR has also attempted to set the agenda in key areas through the use of
thematised annual publications. As such the reports can be interpreted as
an example of the development of productive power linked to a rights-
based discourse.
There are several points relating to the composition of the Dakar Forum
that are relevant for understanding the structure of the EFA architecture.
Firstly, the conference was characterised by in-fighting between the key
sponsoring agencies particularly between UNESCO and UNICEF. In
terms of institutional power dynamics it reflected open competition
between the multilateral organisations over leadership of global education
and the EFA regime in particular. Whilst UNICEF resented the fact that
governments had endorsed UNESCO’s leadership role over EFA,
UNESCO resented that the UN had given UNICEF leadership over educa-
tion for girls. Each institution was also dismissive of the technical capabil-
ities of the other. The only institution that appeared to not have problems
with its identity was the World Bank that maintained its relative position
of hegemony within the sponsoring organisations (Jones & Coleman, 2005;
Torres, 2001). Like Jomtien, the Forum was also Northern dominated.
As Torres argued at the time:
One salient feature (which was noted with displeasure by several national delegations)
was the overbearing presence of functionaries from international agencies at the confer-
ence as a whole and on the various panels and committees, especially the two most
important and most coveted: the Drafting Committee and the ‘Futures Group’. The lat-
ter was charged with suggesting mechanisms for following up the commitments made at
the Forum up until 2015. (2001, p. 1)
Of the governments and NGOs present from Southern countries, there was
a further imbalance in that some regions including Latin America and
South Asia were particularly under-represented. Furthermore, as King
(2007) has pointed out, only one plenary speech was made by a representa-
tive of a low-income country, namely the president of Senegal. All the other
51Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
Un
co
rre
cte
d P
ro
of
speakers were either from the multilateral agencies, representatives of glo-
bal civil society or of donor countries.
Interestingly, in terms of the view of global governance presented
earlier, the emerging concept of EFA was contested. During the same
week as the Dakar conference, an ‘alternative’ EFA event, the
International Consultation of NGOs was held immediately before Dakar.
The Consultation was organised by the NGOs belonging to the Global
Campaign for Education launched in 1999 by two international NGOs,
Oxfam and ActionAid and later joined by Education International (EI),
the international confederation of teacher organisations. This campaign,
was critical of the work done by the EFA movement during the 1990s and
put forward its own Global Action Plan to achieve EFA. Some of those
who took part in the NGO event also participated in the official conference,
a number of them fulfilling important functions at it. As Mundy and
Murphy’s (2001) research showed at the time, some of the claims were met.
Amongst these were inclusion of the wording ‘free’ education; endorsement
of the idea of national educational forums and an expanded definition of
education that includes commitment to early childhood education and
adult literacy and, a commitment to annual high-level EFA review meet-
ings. The campaigners did not wield sufficient compulsory power, however,
to realise their more further-reaching goals including a clear commitment
of resources by rich country governments including minimum investment
targets and a new international funding mechanism for education develop-
ment under joint International Organisation, government and civil south
oversight. Despite its (limited) achievements, the Global Campaign for
Education along with the overall role of NGOs in Dakar was subject to
criticism by Southern-based NGOs for putting forward a Northern-led
agenda. As Mundy and Murphy argued ‘the overall pattern of relationships
among NGOs at Dakar tended to mimic the structure of the centre-
periphery relations in the world system, in which Northern actors play
leadership roles’ (2001, p. 123).
In terms of how EFA was conceptualised as a result of the Dakar pro-
cess, it is clear from the comparison of goals between Jomtien and Dakar
in Table 1 that there was a degree of continuity between the two reflecting
some success on the part of UNESCO in (re-) asserting a more holistic
view of basic education, a move also supported by many of the NGOs
present. Interestingly, the goals also show a subtle shift towards the notion
of education quality linked to improved learning outcomes, particularly in
literacy and numeracy. As will be discussed in other contributions to the
current volume, this is significant in terms of the subsequent move towards
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the notion of ‘access plus quality’ at the heart of current debates about
EFA. Although the increased emphasis on quality was presented as a
complementary goal to that of achieving increases in access, Dakar also
foreshadowed a growing tension between access and quality at the heart of
the MDGs as will be discussed below.
THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS THE
DOMINANT MANIFESTATION OF EFA
A key point of reference that has become inextricably associated with EFA
are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These arose in the con-
text of a different but overlapping global regime of governance, namely
that associated with the Millennium Declaration that was agreed at the
Millennium Summit in New York in 2000 which followed five months after
the Dakar conference. The process by which the actual MDGs were devel-
oped occurred through the Millennium Project, an agency especially set up
for this purpose. Task forces were created for each of the goals, and they
issued background papers, interim reports and a summary report a few
years later for the MDG + 5 UN summit which followed up on progress
on each of the MDGs.
The two MDGs that relate to education are:
MDG 2: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike,
will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.
MDG 3: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later
than 2015.
From our point of view, the way that the MDGs have been developed
and implemented have had profound implications for the nature of EFA as
a regime of global educational governance. Firstly, although the MDGs
arose from the Millennium Declaration and Summit processes they were
actually developed and refined by working groups within the UN and are
narrower in scope than the Declaration. Secondly, given that the education
MDGs in particular represent such a narrowing of scope compared to the
Dakar Framework, it is easy to conclude that in terms of institutional
power, UNESCO had less of an influence in their formulation than it
had on the Dakar and Jomtien goals (King, 2007). Thirdly, as with the
other events seminal to the development of EFA, although the MDGs
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(along with the Dakar Framework) clearly enjoy considerable support
across large sections of the international development community including
many donors and NGOs, there remain issues of Northern dominance in
the process of defining the MDGs and a concomitant lack of Southern
ownership. As several commentators have observed, it is often difficult to
reconcile the realisation of the specific MDG targets with national develop-
ment priorities (Hayman, 2007; King, 2004, 2007; King & Rose, 2006). In
her study of the Rwandan education sector, for example, Hayman has
pointed to the real tensions between investing in basic education to fulfil
the MDGs and in other sectors of education including higher education to
realise other national development priorities (see also Tikly, 2003). As King
(2007) points out, further evidence of the Northern-led nature of the MDG
process is that whereas all of the goals relation to low-income countries are
time-bound, the one goal relating to commitments from Northern countries
is not time-bound.
In terms of how the MDGs as a related but separate global regime of
governance have impacted on EFA, it is possible to conclude the following.
Firstly, as alluded to above, the education MDGs represent a considerable
narrowing of focus compared to the Dakar Framework but yet became the
major focal point for how the aspirations of EFA subsequently became
interpreted in popular and policy discourse. MDG 2, which relates to
access to education is focused on the achievement of UPE which provides
continuity on earlier World Bank discourses relating to UPE for the 1980s.
Secondly, there has been a very real tension between the rhetoric of the
MDGs and the ability of governments to realise them. By 2005 the gender
MDG had been the first to be missed. This in turn highlights the often sub-
stantial differences in capacity between countries in achieving the MDGs.
It was this observation relatively early on in the process which was to lead
donors to establish the Fact Track Initiative (below).
More fundamentally the above tension highlights a contradiction
between the focus of the MDGs on social indicators of development and
the reality that that many low-income countries do not have the economic
means of achieving them due to their positioning on the periphery of the
global economy. This is linked to inequalities in institutional power
between rich and poor countries in terms of their influence on global
regimes concerned with the regulation of global trade and finance that have
a major impact on the capacity of African governments to implement
favourable macroeconomic and fiscal policy (see e.g. Ndikumana, 2014).
This has implications for EFA as an educational regime of governance and
in particular the need to consider EFA and other social regimes such as the
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MDGs as part of a wider ‘regime complex’ (Orsini et al., 2013) that
includes regimes linked to global economic regulation. It also draws atten-
tion to an aspect of the MDGs and of donor support for education in gen-
eral that there is a tendency for donor aid linked to the MDGs to foster
dependency. In some countries, donor support for education makes up
more than 50% of the education budget raising real concerns about the
extent to which it fosters local leadership on the one hand and is sustain-
able in the long term on the other (King, 2007).
A final point relates to the tension implicit in MDG 3 between the rea-
lisation of gender parity though equal enrolments and the more far reach-
ing goal of gender equity that Subrahmanian (2005) describes in terms of
gender rights to, in and through education. That is to say, that there has
been a tension in the EFA project between basic access to education (impli-
cit in the emphasis on UPE) and the experiences of girls once they are in
school. That includes forms of discrimination that deny them equal access
to parts of the curriculum and sexualised violence (see e.g. Milligan, 2014).
Denial of girls access to a good quality education has contributed to
unequal educational outcomes between girls and boys. In explaining this
phenomenon Unterhalter (2013) draws attention to the historical discon-
nect between networks dedicated to gender equity within the MDG regime
and those associated with education, and this point is also taken up below
whilst DeJaeghere draws attention to the differential ability of many
country-level NGOs to advance issues of gender justice both at a national
and at a global level in relation to the MDGs AU:7(Dejaeghere, Parks, &
Unterhalter, 2013).
THE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE
The Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) emerged from the com-
mitment made at the Dakar World Education Forum (WEF) in 2000 to a
Global Initiative. This was initiated by NGOs and supported by UNESCO,
with the aim of holding donors to account with respect to mobilisation of
additional technical and financial resources needed to accelerate progress
towards the EFA goals. In particular, its aim was to ensure that donors
would fulfil their commitment made at the WEF that ‘No countries ser-
iously committed to EFA will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal
by a lack of resources’. Further motivation was provided by another global
regime, this time the Monterrey Consensus in 2002, at which ministers of
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finance indicated that they were committed to substantially increasing over-
seas development assistance (ODA) (Rose, 2005). Concerns that UNESCO
lacked the capacity and confidence of key bilateral donors to lead the
Global Initiative, resulted in the World Bank taking on a coordinating
role, with a shift from a ‘Global’ to a ‘Fast Track’ Initiative (Rose, 2003).
As a consequence, an FTI Secretariat was established within the World
Bank, with the support of other donors. The FTI was launched in April
2002. Despite strong political commitment, initial pledges to the FTI were
limited due to concerns over the perceived centralised nature and lack of
clarity about the purpose of the initiative (below). Following changes to
the structure and with the adoption of the Framework Agreement in 2004,
however, pledges began to rise. In keeping with debates about aid effective-
ness, countries were invited to join if they were judged to have in place a
robust education sector development plan. In this way the FTI was
designed to ‘reward’ countries that prioritised basic education in keeping
with the MDGs. The FTI was organised around a ‘Virtual Fund’ which
incorporated donor countries existing bilateral arrangements with recipient
countries and a ‘Catalytic Fund’ that was intended to benefit ‘donor
orphans’, (i.e. countries that had five donors or fewer contributing
$1 million per year to the education sector) and was targeted at building
capacity within the education sector that would enable them to develop
credible education plans.
From the point of view of understanding EFA as a global regime of edu-
cational governance, it is quite clear that the initiative provided continuity
on previous themes whilst also signalling new directions in the structure of
EFA as well as in the norms and values that underpinned it. As with pre-
vious initiatives and in terms of the dynamics of institutional power there
was considerable in-fighting between the multilateral agencies over initial
control of the FTI and as with previous initiatives it was the World Bank
that proved hegemonic. The FTI was often perceived by the other agencies
as a ‘World Bank Programme’ (Bermingham, 2011; Jones & Coleman,
2005). Indeed, UNESCO only became a member of the FTI steering com-
mittee in 2004 but was not formally involved in decision-making processes
at the trust fund meetings. UNICEF was only invited to join the steering
committee in 2006.
Contests over the nature and direction of FTI were not only horizontal,
between multilateral agencies but also involved vertical struggles between
the World Bank and individual country donors and with civil society orga-
nisations and networks at country and global level. There was from the
outset considerable confusion about the purpose of the FTI. Seventeen
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countries were invited to join the partnership, but there was no commit-
ment at the time for member countries to commit substantial amounts of
money. Part of this confusion revolved around the issue of whether it
should become a Global Fund for Education to match the Global Fund to
Fight Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM) which was being developed at the
same time. From the perspective of the present chapter this is another
example of how global regimes need to be understood in relation to other
global regimes, this time around health. Initially, many leaders were reluc-
tant to support an initiative which remained conceptually vague.
There were also tensions at the outset between the World Bank and
some leading donors including DfID who objected to the centralised nature
of the initiative that it was claimed would undermine local decision-
making. This led eventually to the devolution of country-level endorsement
for joining the Fund to the local donor group who would assess the viabi-
lity of the education sector plan against international benchmarks. In
exchange, local donor groups were expected to contribute more to their
existing bilateral programmes. There were also concerns that the fund
through only providing support to countries with already developed educa-
tion plans, marginalised those that had traditionally not received donor
support and the fact that it did not address the needs of the so-called ‘big
five’ countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Sudan) where more than half the children out of school lived.
This in turn led to the development of the Virtual Fund which incorporated
donors existing bilateral programmes and the World Bank managed
Catalytic Fund which provided capacity building support to ‘donor
orphan’ countries (see above). The adoption of a common framework in
2004 led to increases in donor support and by 2005 the FTI was judged to
be having more of a positive effect at country level. A consensus emerged
between donors that the FTI provided a means for increased donor coordi-
nation, alignment and harmonisation in keeping with debates about aid
effectiveness and the Paris Declaration (below). Indeed, the FTI received
endorsements by the G8 and the UN Millennium Summit in 2005.
As with previous initiatives, global civil society also played a role in
shaping the FTI at key junctures. The Global Campaign for Education
played a leading advocacy role in the establishment of the FTI. The Make
Poverty History Campaign and the concerted civil society campaigns
around the G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005 were also influential in re-
invigorating donor commitments to the FTI. Also characteristic of earlier
events in the development of EFA was the subordinate role played by low-
income countries and governments. Even after responsibility for evaluating
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country plans had been devolved to country level they continued to be eval-
uated against global benchmarks that provided a disciplinary mechanism
by which largely Northern donors could coerce national governments in
the global South towards prioritising global agendas  in this case a nar-
rowed down version of the MDGs  which at times, as we have seen are at
odds with national development agendas that may involve investing in a
more balanced way across different sub-sectors of education. This can be
seen as an example of the use of compulsory power, albeit in more subtle
form than was the case with the imposition of SAPs.
THE ROME AND PARIS DECLARATIONS ON AID
EFFECTIVENESS
Discussion of the FTI draws attention to a key set of issues and tensions
that have characterised EFA since inception, namely those surrounding
‘aid effectiveness’. For example, attempts were made to align the FTI with
the principles of aid effectiveness and donor harmonisation that were emer-
ging from the first high-level donor forum in Rome (OECD/DAC, 2003).
The Rome Declaration listed the following priority actions:
• that development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and
timing of the countries receiving it;
• that donor efforts concentrate on delegating cooperation and increasing
the flexibility of staff on country programmes and projects;
• and, that good practice be encouraged and monitored, backed by analy-
tic work to help strengthen the leadership that recipient countries can
take in determining their development path.
The Second High-Level Forum resulted in the Paris Declaration (2005)
which was an important landmark in the development of the discourse
around aid effectiveness. It presented itself as ‘a practical, action-oriented
roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development’.
It provided a series of specific implementation measures and established a
monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients
hold each other accountable for their commitments. The Paris Declaration
outlined the following five principles for making aid more effective:
1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
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2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use
local systems.
3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and
share information to avoid duplication.
4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development
results and results get measured.
5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for devel-
opment results.
Although it has been followed up by the more recent Accra and Busan
high-level meetings discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present
chapter, it is fair to say that the Paris Declaration was pivotal in shaping
the current debate on aid effectiveness. In terms of our analysis the princi-
ples of aid effectiveness constitute like the MDGs, a parallel regime of
global governance that reinforces EFA but also provides potential sources
of tension. In terms of institutional power, the Paris Declaration repre-
sented a growing consensus amongst donor and recipient countries around
underling principles governing aid. There is a tension, however, in that
although the Paris Declaration included most of the low-income countries
and the BRIC economies, these emerging donors have never been integral
to the EFA agenda and indeed, as other contributions to this volume indi-
cate to have increasingly pursued their own agendas. These institutional
relationships call into question, the likelihood of achieving a core principle
of aid effectiveness, namely that of harmonisation.
In terms of productive power, the way that aid effectiveness has become
defined also has implications for how EFA is conceptualised. The aid effec-
tiveness discourse as set out in the Paris Declaration is fundamentally an
economic discourse about seeking to achieve maximum return on aid. This
is reflected, for instance in the increasing move towards ‘payment by
results’ by key donors such as DfID. It feeds into a reductionist view of the
relationship between education understood as a narrow set of quantifiable
indicators and development understood principally in terms of economic
growth. As such it stands in contrast to more expansive, rights-based
conceptualisations of education and development (see e.g. Tikly &
Barrett, 2011).
Secondly, there is a tension between the concept of aid effectiveness
and the way that EFA has up until now been implemented. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that the principle of ‘ownership’ is compromised by
the limited choice that low-income national governments have in accepting
the conditionalities that go along with aid. For example, through linking
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aid to MDGs or other targets that may not in fact coincide with national
development priorities and the use of global benchmarks to evaluate educa-
tion sector plans. The principle of ownership is often related to government
ownership rather than to that of civil society organisations that may indeed
oppose government policy. In this sense ‘ownership’ is understood princi-
pally as a ‘technical’ principle rather than a political and normative one
liked to an understanding of the political economy of different countries.
As has been suggested, a major obstacle to genuine ownership is the depen-
dency that much educational aid fosters. Finally, ‘accountability’ appears
as ‘one way traffic’ in the discourse of aid effectiveness as it is applied to
EFA. As we have seen, the only EFA target that is typically not time-
bound is that relating to the proportion of GDP that ought to be com-
mitted to aid, including educational aid, in wealthy countries. In this
respect, discourses of aid effectiveness are separated out from an analysis
of global political economy and a broader understanding of the legitima-
tory role played by aid in a global economy marked by historically rooted
structural inequality in wealth and power between nations.
CONCLUSION
In this final section an attempt will be made to draw together the main
themes and arguments in the chapter. It is suggested that conceptualising
EFA as an example of a global regime of educational governance provides
a useful lens through which to critically consider the changing institutional
relationships and underling norms and values that comprise the EFA aid
architecture. In particular, applying a global governance framework makes
it possible to consider the extent to which EFA has shaped through the
exercise of different forms of power and through its relationship to other
global regimes of governance.
Firstly, in relation to the exercise of institutional power, EFA has been
successful in bringing together under its umbrella a diverse range of low-
income countries including more recently, post-conflict nations and fragile
states and coordinating the activities of a range of bilateral country donors.
Nonetheless, there have been on-going contests over the governance of
EFA between multilateral organisations. Historically in the period under
review the World Bank has proved hegemonic in these struggles despite the
continued claims to ownership of EFA by UNESCO and to a lesser extent
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UNICEF. Global civil society has had some influence particularly in an
advocacy role.
Related to the above has been the Northern-led nature of EFA. Despite
the rhetoric of inclusivity both in the context of the World Education
Forums and in the governing structures of the institutions most closely
associated with EFA, the overall agenda remains Northern-  and
indeed  Western-led. This is evidenced in the dominance of Northern
interests within the governance structures of the leading institutions that
have in turn been reflected in the processes through which key EFA frame-
works and protocols have been developed. It is also reflected in the use of
compulsory power to ensure that education sector plans adhere to EFA
principles in the context, for example, of the FTI Fund. This is in contrast
to the use of fewer conditionalities to ensure Northern country compliance
with meeting development targets. Whatever compulsory power has been
exerted on high-income countries has often been as a consequence of cam-
paigns on the part of global civil society. It has been suggested that here
too, however, it has most often been Northern rather than indigenous,
Southern-led organisations that have had most ‘voice’ in global debates
and forums.
There have also been some discernible shifts in the way that EFA has
been conceptualised. The broad vision, based on an expanded notion of
EFA and linked to a rights-based agenda has been superseded by a focus
on a narrower set of time-bound targets exemplified by the MDGs
although there is some evidence that the debate may be broadening out
once again in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and develop-
ment debate. Despite the title of ‘Education for All’, the narrowing of tar-
gets implied by the MDGs and the way that funding has been channelled,
particularly in the early days of the FTI have tended to favour low-income
countries that have had the capacity to develop robust education sector
development plans. Many, particularly marginalised and disadvantaged
groups, were neglected as a consequence of this and of a lack of nuance in
the way that funding was targeted within countries. One can see this as an
aspect of the effects of a particular form of productive power in which
narrow and easily quantifiable targets are favoured over more nuanced
quantitative and qualitative targets. The advocacy work of reports such as
the GMR and the quantitative and qualitative evidence base on which it
draws have provided an alternative source of productive power, linked to a
more rights-based emphasis on targeting the most marginalised.
It is also important to consider EFA in relation to other regimes of
global governance. It has been suggested that EFA has developed
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sometimes in tension with other global regimes, most notably those govern-
ing, the MDGs, aid effectiveness and gender. This has provided both a
source of strength for EFA in helping to shape its character and a source
of tension through providing contrasting rationale for action and in the
definition of targets. On the other hand, EFA has also failed to engage
with other key areas of global governance including health despite the
potential lessons that can be learnt from such an engagement. In order to
become more sustainable as an area of social development and in order to
tackle the dependency of many low-income countries on donor support, it
has been suggested that EFA also needs to be seen in relation to global
regimes in the economic sphere including those governing trade and finan-
cial markets over which low-income countries also have limited control.
To conclude, EFA as a global regime has proved remarkably resilient in
the face of considerable tensions and contradictions. Only time will tell,
however, whether it will continue to adapt in the context of the emerging
post-2015 education and development agenda or, whether it will need to
fundamentally transform itself into a new global regime of educational
governance if it is to survive. Much of this it has been suggested will depend
on the extent to which governmental and non-governmental actors are able
to recognise and engage with power imbalances at the heart of EFA and to
line EFA up more coherently with other areas of global governance.
NOTE
1. In this regard the chapter is also timely given the on-going reviews of the out-
comes and processes of EFA currently being undertaken by UNESCO. See http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/educa-
tion-for-all/resources/national-efa-2015-reviews/. Last accessed on August 6, 2015.
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